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11. Introduction
From a wide literature — Akermann (2008) Barrell and Davis (2008), Bordo (2008), Buiter
(2008), Caballero (2006), Calomiris (2008), Diamond and Raghuram (2009) among others —,
the main causes of the subprime crisis can be set:
› The "great moderate" macro-environment coupled with micro-economic deﬁciency.
First, before the crisis, there is a sustained economic growth characterized by a positive
output gap and a controlled inﬂation in the United States. These national features in favour
of certainty on future investments are coupled with lower international interest rates due to
the increasing amount of liquidity since 2001 from emerging countries such as China. Barrell
and Choy (2005) show that the Chinese positive current account explains more than half the
cutting of real international interest rate during the 90s and the early 20s. These trends
generate more opportunities to free lending operations and increase the assets prices before
the crisis.
Second, there is huge proﬁtability in prospect inside the ﬁnancial system thanks to the
extent of the business cycle and to the developing ﬁnancial innovations. Simultaneously, the
US government gives several incentives to homeownership. On the supply side, it leads cred-
itworthy borrowers to mortgage leverage. On the demand side, those who have gained access
to credit would have never been ﬁnanced had they been closely scrutinized. Consequently,
the credit rationing is too low. It allows bad quality borrowers to obtain credit that in turn
sustains the glooming US housing market. Hence, the link between both credit and real estate
m a r k e t si se s t a b l i s h e d . T h er e s e a r c ho fm o r ep r o ﬁtability by lenders on the credit market
meets the need for new types of housing demands to be ﬁnanced. But, the real estate price
bubble promotes risky lending provided that housing prices are still increasing.
However, as the assets bubble is linked to a furious research of proﬁtability associated with
the acceptance of higher risk levels, in 2006-2007, the structure of ﬁnancial innovations move
to more and more complexity. Banks move from a ﬁnely assessed pull of borrowers in their
lending activity to authorized dealers of asset backed securities. Simultaneously, they use
more frequently Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to still conform the Basel rules on capital
ratios.
The securitization is designed to partition the whole risk among several ﬁnancial market
insiders that each share a shorter extent of it. Securitization is not detrimental per se.F o r
instance, Vaugirard (2001) focusses on the need of securitization to increase the capacity
of insurers to manage risks associated with catastrophic events. Nevertheless, in line with
the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the risk assessment associated with ﬁnancial assets becomes more
diﬃcult because the distinction among toxic and safe assets is challenged (e.g. Gorton (2008)).
Incidentally, rating agencies lose credibility in their workmanship.
By this way, as Brunnermeier (2008) reminds us, a major condition favourable to amplify
the crisis emerges when it occurs (a turning in the belief that "business could go on"). Indeed,
when any default risk moves to reality, not only it diminishes the net value of the direct
creditor linked to the default borrower, but also, it puts doubts on the net value of all the
market participants that are related to this creditor.
The historical sequence of the crisis is studied in many papers such as IMF (2008), Brun-
nermeier (2008), Greenlaw et al. (2008). Nevertheless, the two key quarters of the crisis are
the third quarter of 2007 and the fourth one of 2008. The ﬁr s td a t ed e ﬁnes the ﬁrst default
on the interbank market in August. The second associated with the news about the Lehman
B r o t h e r sf a i l u r ec o n s t i t u t e st h eo r i g i no ft h es y s t e m i cd i m e n s i o no ft h ec r i s i sa ta ni n t e r n a -
tional level. The propagation velocity of the crisis at an international scale is unprecedented
2owing to the globalization and the uncomplicated securitization process. As the location and
the assessment of the risk become more and more uncertain, all the ﬁnancial institutions that
own subprime securities contribute to spread the crisis. Therefore, the conﬁdence necessary to
a non-destabilizing circulation of liquidity within the global economy disappears quite rapidly.
Thus, drying interbank markets appear, sometimes where it is not forecasted. Developed as
well as developing countries have no warranty on their ability to prevent the contagion since
they have no warranty on their ability to struggle against the storm.
› The inconvenient Fed monetary policy.
Various theoretical sources could partially explain the ﬁnancial instability initiated and
propagated through the subprime crisis. For instance, it is about the theory of ﬁnancial
instability with Minsky (1977), the huge uncertainty and a reversal conﬁdence with Shaﬀer
(1986), the disaster myopia and the credit rationing like in Herring and Watcher (1999), runs
and liquidity crisis from Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the spread linked to shifts in market
prices (Adrian and Shin 2008a). Nevertheless, the bursting of the ﬁnancial boom is due to the
reversal of the Federal Reserve monetary policy. The rising interest rates reveal the reality of
the extent of the default risk that aﬀects ﬁnancial markets (notably the credit market) and
consequently the real estate market on the real sphere. This monetarist view is consistent
with Friedman and Schwartz (1963), when they explain the origin of the failure of a banking
system by cuts in the money supply after an erroneous switching monetary policy regime.
The reversal trend operated by the US monetary policy between 2006:3 and 2007:3 (with
the higher Federal Funds Rate since 2000 around a value of more than 5%) shifts proﬁtabil-
ity opportunities to lose risk. Consequently, the conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial markets turns
whereas previously notably sustains the real expansion through the housing market. This sit-
uation results in a lack of conﬁdence among banks on the interbank market and also between
commercial banks and their respective existing customers.
Anyway, the monetary policy response to the subprime turmoil ﬁrst uses traditional in-
tervention from interest rate. In august 9th, 2007, an increase in the level of temporary open
market operations is registered. From the following September to December, a cumulated 100
basis points cut in target federal funds rate is produced. As the ﬁnancial storm still is ongo-
ing, on December the Fed creates the Term Auction Facility and opens swap lines with the
European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. From this month, new and traditional
monetary instruments are combined in order to either ease the liquidity circulation inside the
banking system and among ﬁnancial institutions and their customers, or to avoid liquidity to
become a destabilizing factor for real economic activities.
Owing to the Federal Reserve’s mandate concerning the inﬂation and the economic growth,
it is normal that monetary policy seems to be a privileged tool to struggle against the ﬁnan-
cial turmoil. Anyway, monetary policy is based on monetary transmission channels. More
precisely, the quality of the monetary regulation depends on whether or not the monetary
transmission is eﬀective. The various channels that convey a change in the monetary policy
interest rates are explained in the special volume 9 of the Journal of Economic Perspectives
in 1995 (Bernanke and Gertler, Meltzer, Mishkin, Taylor), Kuttner and Mosser (2002), and
more recently in line with the recent turmoil in IMF (2008), Tobias and Shin (2008b), Bhatia
(2007).
How to deﬁne the eﬀectiveness here? The eﬀectiveness can be deﬁned with diﬀerent analysis
levels. In the ﬁr s to n e ,ac h a n n e li se ﬀective if it concretely exists. However, the existence of any
phenomenon says nothing on its intensity; hence there is a second analysis level. Eﬀectiveness
implies a certain extent of existence of the studied phenomenon.
3The question is how US monetary transmission eﬀectiveness evolves around the subprime
crisis. Is the Fed failure to reverse the crisis due to the ineﬀective monetary transmission or
to eﬀective but not suﬃcient monetary transmission intensity?
T h ea i mo ft h i sp a p e rc o n s i s t so ff u r t h e ra r g u m e n t st og u i d et h ea n s w e r . T oa c h i e v ei t ,
section 2 comes back to the real US monetary policy guide around the subprime crisis. It
puts in relation what could be expected from the theoretical monetary transmission channels
and how the ﬁnancial instability can interact with the monetary transmission in order to
establish the crisis. Section 3 explains the method followed to value the monetary transmission
eﬀectiveness from a dynamic procedure. Before concluding, section 4, interprets the results
focussing on the direct transmission mechanisms.
2. Fed policy errors and monetary transmission channels
Before the crisis, beyond the causes brieﬂy exposed in the introduction, the accommodating
Fed monetary policy feeds the increasing liquidity in the ﬁnancial system as the very low real
interest rates translate. Same as usual a lax monetary policy appears as a determining factor
of credit and asset pricing dynamics (e.g. Bordo and Wheelock (2007)). Taylor (2007 and
2009) shows how much lower the interest rate is in comparison to the theoretical rates obtained
from a Taylor rule between the fourth quarter of 2001 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2006.
According to Akermann (2008), if demographic arguments justify the housing price booms,
the central bankers’ stance is deeply involved in the expansion of subprime mortgages. Tobias
and Shin (2008a) show that the balance sheet of ﬁnancial intermediaries give evidence of raising
(lowering) leverage during asset price booms (burst). The Fed stance is taken after the stock
assets prices bubble from 2000 to 2003. But, the boom in the housing sector during 2003-2004
balances the previous losses in the stockmarket linked to the monetary policy. However, no
monetary policy early prevents the sharply increasing dynamics on the real estate sector.
4As a consequence, before 2006, the monetary transmission mechanisms associated with the
future destabilizing factors can be schematized as follows1:
During the crisis, the Fed reproduces the same mistake in its monetary policy. It is only
a year after the activation of the crisis (in September 2008), the monetary authorities clearly
identify the solvency issue on the credit market. But during, the ﬁrst year of the crisis, the Fed
mainly focuses economic growth as the main pillar in its aims, by trying to insure a convenient
liquidity circulation inside the market. The principle that authorizes such a stance is the risk
to move from a credit crunch to an economic recession, whereas one of the Fed’s objective
is growth. But, whatever the amount of liquidity inside the system is, if there is no way to
distinguish the solvent from the insolvent debtors, there will be no way for ﬁnancial markets
to sustain growth eﬀectively, because the amount of liquidity will not circulate or even support
the trade made by the riskier agents.
As a result, in the early stages of the crisis, thanks to lower interest rates, an excessive
lax money supply follows in favour of more liquidity in circulation and according to the belief
that monetary policy should contribute to the long period of growth whereas a slowdown
seems quite unavoidable and even desirable. Buiter (2008) p. 225 clearly expresses this belief
saying that "[The Fed] did all it could through large and aggressive cuts in the Fed funds rate, to
1Mishkin (2009) and Kuttner and Mosser (2002) inspire the ﬁgure 2.
5prevent or at least to mitigate the necessary and inevitable slowdown, eﬀectively interpreting the
‘maximum employment’ leg of its mandate not as the maximal sustainable level of employment
or the maximum sustainable rate of growth, but as the maintenance of high levels of current
employment and current real GDP growth regardless of their sustainability".
According to Bordo (2008), Buiter (2008), two arguments found the Fed stance:
› An overestimation of wealth eﬀect linked to the boom in housing prices during the
previous period.
This mislead can be explained by the extent of the housing prices bubble and the potential
eﬀect of their burst on consumer demand and hence on growth. But, as Buiter (2008) reminds
us, a distinction should be necessary among ‘short’ and ‘long’ housing consumers at a micro
level when wealth eﬀect on consumption is emphasized. If it is not the case, a composition
fallacy may contribute to overestimate the impact of this wealth eﬀect on the global demand,
provided there is a housing prices reversal. However, at this point the Fed is too afraid of a
disruption in the economic growth due to the asset prices burst and to a reversal of the lending
activity. As a consequence, the monetary policy orientation is in favour of a sharp decrease in
the FFR in order to limit the economic slowdown.
›Af o c u so nt h ec o r ei n ﬂation instead of the headline inﬂation that moves the price
ﬂuctuations away from the 2% objective.
Since the 20s, core inﬂation cannot be considered as a very good predictor of the headline
inﬂation. This is due to an increasing ratio of the core to non-core prices because of the
integration of more emergent countries in the globalization that has persistently moved the
demand and supply of both core and non-core goods, hence the ratio of both related prices.
As a result, on ﬁgure 3, it is clear that the core inﬂation gap (the spread of the core inﬂation
with the 2% inﬂation objective of the monetary policy) leads to a underestimation of headline
inﬂation particularly during the more accurate crisis period (from 2007:3 to 2008:3), if the
core inﬂation is used as a predictor of the headline inﬂation.
6During the crisis, the Fed tries to initiate dynamics between ﬁnancial and real spheres
through monetary transmission channels that go in an opposite direction with the destabilizing
ﬁnancial factors at the origin of the crisis. Stressing on what has really happened, there is no
doubt that the struggle has been won by these, what justiﬁes the accuracy of the economic
recession.
Nevertheless, there is a debate to know if such a defeat is due to a total ineﬀective monetary
policy or a monetary policy that is not eﬀective enough to contest the destabilizing elements.
According to Mishkin (2009), diﬀerent arguments defend the last position from a counter-
factual analysis.
Instead of decreasing interest rates, a tighter monetary policy would make the recession
more severe according to the theoretical monetary transmission. As a consequence, the mon-
etary policy would create dynamics that permit the destabilizing factors from the credit and
housing sectors to lead the whole economy toward a deeper crisis. Besides, a restrictive Fed
stance would not make easier the risk assessment. As a result, the easing of the monetary
policy during the ﬁrst periods of the crisis would have permitted to mitigate the recession but
not to avoid it. The diﬀerence in the strength of the inﬂuence on the real economy of both
opposite dynamics (monetary transmission and destabilizing factors) justiﬁes the unavoidable
feature of the crisis. However, Mishkin (2009) p.1 says "monetary policy is more potent dur-
ing ﬁnancial crises because aggressive monetary policy easing can make adverse feedback loops
less likely. The fact that monetary policy is more potent than during normal times provides a
rationale for a risk-management approach to counter the contractionary eﬀects from ﬁnancial
crises".
Conversely, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2008) argue that mon-
e t a r yp o l i c yi si n e ﬀective during the crisis because it does not succeed to avoid the fall in the
lending activity even by a sharp decrease in the federal funds rate.
The ﬁght between the monetary transmission channels and the destabilizing factors before
and during the crisis is put forward. To give an idea of how the monetary policy has more or
less performed against these factors, it is necessary to have the empirical dynamic eﬀectiveness
of the monetary transmission mechanisms before and during the crisis.
3. Dynamic procedure to measure the eﬀectiveness of monetary transmission
eﬀectiveness
As ﬁgure 2 shows, a network of transmission chains going from the instrument of monetary
policy to its targets on the real sphere compose the whole monetary transmission. What are
t h ep r i n c i p l e st h a tw i l lg u i d et h ed y n a m i cm e a s u r eo fm o n e t a r yt r a n s m i s s i o ne ﬀectiveness?
› An empirical representation of transmission: as showed by Bates (2005)2,c a u s a l i t y
is one way to obtain such a representation. Causality is still in debate among econometricians
and economists. According to Zellner (1988), the Feigl (1953) deﬁnition of causation should
be focused on. As in Granger (1969), the existence of a causal relation must be recognized
on the basis of an improvement in the forecasting of the caused variable3. This improvement
must be conﬁrmed experimentally from an economic framework of reference. It is about the
theoretical background that justiﬁes the causal hypothesis, as well as the implications this
hypothesis has in terms of forecasting improvement.
2This intuition has already been used for a study of ﬁnancial contagion (Marais and Bates, 2006).
3Monetary transmission is non-instantaneous. However, Granger (1969) separates the instantaneous causal-
ity of the unidirectional causality, while Sims (1980) integrates the ﬁrst in the second. That is the reason why
it is appropriate to choose the Granger causality.
7›A ne ﬃcient measure of transmission intensity: due to the traditionally used
discrete data, empirical issues emerge when dealing with causality among variables of diﬀerent
economic spheres that implies diﬀerent statistical properties. It should be better to consistently
work, whatever the stationary variables orders are inside the systems of interest that model
the potential monetary transmission chains at a macro scale. That is the reason why the
causality test should be invariant to these statistical properties of series.
However, few procedures give the possibility to measure the causal intensity that would
proxy the eﬀectiveness in an empirical viewpoint. When this measure is available (Geweke,
1982), it is not useful whatever the type of data is. It is necessary to have a causal intensity
measure that is computable whatever the variables of interest are and however easy it is to
objectively interpret the intensity (low or high).
What are the diﬀerent stages to measure the eﬀectiveness from a causal intensity measure?
Let us note y1 the monetary policy control variable, yA one transmission variable, y2 a
target on the real sphere. A direct monetary transmission supposes that the following null
hypotheses are rejected:
H01: y1 9 yA (1st link);
H02: yA 9 y2 (2nd link).
Various causal procedures were taken into account. Those reasoning on groups of variables
[as in Yamamoto and Kurozumi (2006), on stationary series as in Geweke (1982), or on non-
stationary with cointegration (Toda and Phillips 1994; Bruneau and Jondeau, 1999), on Fully
Modiﬁed Vector AutoRegression (Phillips, 1995; Mill, 1998) or on counterfactual analysis
principles (Bates, 2005)] do not give as much satisfaction than the procedure of Toda and
Yamamoto (1995), Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) — TYDL —.
The TYDL procedure4 directly achieves the causality test while reducing the need of pre-
liminaries such as unit root and cointegration tests. It is valid whatever the stationary order
of series of interest is. Swamson, Ozyldirim and Pisu (2003) compare diﬀerent causality pro-
cedures and ﬁnd that the TYDL one should be chosen because of its easiness coupled with
4For further explanations on the original procedure and its statistical validity, refer to authors or to the
simpliﬁed synthesis (Marais and Bates, 2006).
8its statistical validity. The TYDL procedure is based on a Vector AutoRegression (VAR)
approach, one of the still current method to assess changes in monetary transmission through
time like in Boivin and Giovanni (2002, 2003) for instance.
Therefore, for any transmission mechanism, it is necessary to determine the optimal lag
(k) of the VAR in level that includes the variables. It is necessary to add to k an u m b e r
of lags dmax =0to 2. This overparameterization (a VA R (p = k + dmax) is necessary to
use an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation even if the VAR may or may not contain
non-stationary data. Therefore, dmax represents the maximal integration order of series in
the VAR. In accordance with the original TYDL procedure, after estimating the VAR, Wald
restriction tests are made from the ﬁrst k matrices of coeﬃcients to valid H01 and H02.
It is convenient to give a measure of the causal intensity that meets the three rules deﬁned
in Geweke (1982):
— to be computer-friendly and easily interpretable;
— to be strictly positive in case of causality.
— to be an increasing function of the causal strength if the causal relation is validated.
From the estimated VAR, it is possible to compute the elasticity of the caused variable
in relation to the causal variable. But, any monetary transmission mechanism implies an
intermediate variable between the monetary policy instrument and its target on the real sphere.
That is the reason why an indirect elasticity could be computed instead of a direct elasticity.
This indirect elasticity is the product of the direct elasticities of the caused variable in relation
to the causal one of both H01 and H02, provided that these null hypotheses are rejected.
As a result, the eﬀectiveness of any monetary transmission (Monetary Transmission Eﬀec-






(1+|ey2t/y1t|) ∈ ]0;1[, if H01 and H02 are rejected
0, if any null hypothesis is accepted
ey2t/y1t represents the indirect elasticity that links both extremities of the tested monetary
transmission chain. Elasticity has the advantage to be a non-unit measure. It is invariant
to diﬀerences of level, of unit and of nature among variables from diﬀerent economic spheres.
MTE respects the characteristics of a good measure of causal intensity according to Geweke
(1982). Particularly, it is an increasing function of the causal presumption degree and of the
intensity of the relation between both extremities of the transmission chain. It is positive
when the causal chain exists and is equal to zero otherwise.
› A dynamic measure of transmission intensity: T h ep r e v i o u sm e t h o di sb a s e do na
VAR model that can be estimated considering time-varying coeﬃcients. The idea is to suppose
that the eﬀect of monetary policy, on output as well as on inﬂation, is not stable through time.
Alternative approaches can be used. One possibility consists in using a rolling VAR. Another
o n ei st h eu s eo faK a l m a nﬁlter to estimate TV-VAR. In such a case, the estimator of the
ﬁnal sample (which end with the ﬁnal observation of the sample) is the same of a standard
OLS estimator. Hence, the parameters can equivalently be estimated recursively using OLS
as explained in Harvey (1981a and 1981b). This last solution is chosen.
As a consequence for each period in the dynamic procedure of estimation, not only the
existence of the causal chain characteristic of the studied monetary transmission is tested, but
also the value of its intensity/eﬀectiveness is measured. In this way, it is possible to identify
for when and which channel there is disruption in the monetary transmission.
94- Evolution of the US eﬀectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanisms
Figure 2 presents the theoretical monetary transmission channels. Of course they act
simultaneously but it could be useful to study the monetary eﬀectiveness to stress on each
channel separately. In such a case, only the eﬀectiveness of the direct transmission mechanisms
are assessed. As their complementary dynamics are not taken into account, the induced
monetary transmission channels are not included in the following measure.
4.1 The data
The quarterly basis sample goes from 1980:2-2008:4. Intentionally, available data for previ-
ous dates are not integrated in order to avoid treating the structural breaks observable during
1970s and the big break in the monetary policymaking with the Volcker nomination at the
head of the Fed. Also, working from 1980 allows us to obtain a sample length consistent with
a good power of the TYDL causal procedure.
y1 represents the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). y2 is alternatively the output gap (GDPgap)
and headline inﬂation gap (Pgap), depending on the ﬁnal target of the monetary policy con-
sidered to analyse one speciﬁc transmission mechanism. yA alternatively represents the long-
term interest rate (LTIR)/credit in volume to the private sector (CREDIT)/the lending rate
(LR)/the share price index (SPI)/the home price index (HPI)/the real exchange rate index
(RER) in order to test respectively the eﬀectiveness of the interest rate channel, the credit
channel in volume, the cost credit channel, the stock asset price one, the real estate channel
and the exchange rate channel. To give further details:
GDPgap =1 0 0∗
(GDP−potential GDP)
potential GDP
For more accuracy, the potential GDP is computed from a structural unobserved compo-
nent (UC) modelling. Traditionally, ﬁlters are used to extract the GDP trend. Contrary to
ﬁltering methods or to the Beveridge and Nelson representation, this modelling is selected due
to its numerous advantages:
— Modelling in level of non-stationary data;
— Ability to insert some structural interventions or outliers when modelling any time com-
ponent;
— Estimation of cycle periods and ability to show the presence of common time components
among variables of the same sphere5.
— Ability to choose between the best univariate and multivariate modelling from several
criteria: the speed of convergence toward the eﬀective dynamics of series, the mean standard
deviation of residuals, the CUSUM and CUSUM in square, Bowman-Shenton and Doornick-
Hansen normality tests and information AIC or the BIC criterion.
The Kalman ﬁlter UC modelling is the most eﬃcient method to extract the trend compo-
nent (Harvey, 1989; Koopman, Shephard and Doornick, 2000) and to seasonally adjust data.
This is the reason why the method is used to seasonally adjust the data or check the absence
of seasonal component inside database using other seasonal adjustment procedures.
Pgap=Inﬂation rate - 2%
LTIR is proxied by the 10 year government bonds yield.
5For further details on similar cycles, common cycles and trends, refer to Koopman, Shephard and Doornick
(2000), Harvey, Koopman and Shephard (2004).
10It is quite diﬃcult to empirically split, the narrow from the broad credit channel. Never-
theless, for both, there are transmission chains that operate through the price (the credit cost
LR) and others that transit through the volume (Credit). This distinction between the cost
and volume credit transmissions is all the more convenient that Kierzenkowski (2004) reminds
that spreads between LR and other rates with a short maturity do not help to diﬀerentiate
with certainty the narrow from the broad credit transmissions.
SPI is the internationally harmonized share prices index computed by the International
Financial Statistics (International Monetary Funds statistics). There is no such international
measure for real estate assets. Moreover, the traditionally used Case & Shiller index starts
from 1987, that would reduce the estimation sample and hence the power of the TYDL test
that needs at least 70 observations to work well. Therefore, HPI is a substitute index from
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (ex OFHEO)6. The Case & Shiller index is a biased
measure of the overall housing market. Not only it integrates a part of the US area, but
contrary to the HPI of the OFHEO it gives less accuracy to the prices of houses ﬁnanced
in the prime mortgage market. According to Calomiris, Lonhofer and Miles (2008), the used
HPI is better to capture the consumption wealth eﬀect of house price ﬂuctuations because
of it is more reactive to households whose consumption behavior depends on the dynamics of
their house value.
RER and other indicators come from the International Financial Statistics. All data is
computed in real term with a 2000 basis.
4 . 2R e s u l t sa n di n t e r p r e t a t i o n
There is no process based on information criterion to identify the lag structure of the TV-
VAR system linked to a speciﬁc transmission channel. This is why a wide variety of models
are tested (variables in level, variable in diﬀerence, with diﬀerent values of k). The best
models in estimation are selected. On the estimation sample period, models with variables in
diﬀerence perform best. The following graphics contain the historical value of the output gap,
the inﬂation gap; and the measured MTE on these two monetary targets through each direct
transmission mechanism.





6For a detailed presentation of this index refer to Calhoun (1996).





Fig. 6 Direct monetary transmission effectiveness on the output gap 
 
 
From ﬁgure 4, the critical periods for the output gap are 2007:3 where the dramatic slow-
down starts, 2008:1 where the recession is conﬁrmed because of a lower ongoing eﬀective
growth than the potential growth and 2008:3 which is the worst quarter in terms of growth.
Considering the headline inﬂation gap, the crucial dates are 2006:4 where the inﬂation issue
starts to become more and more accurate, with two consecutive quarters of wider increasing
gap 2007:3-2007:4 and similarly but with less extent 2008:2-2008:3. The fourth quarter of
2008 seems to be better quarter in terms of macroeconomic stability with a sharp decrease in
the inﬂation gap coupled with a less unfavourable output gap even if the United States is still
facing in economic recession.
Figures 5 and 6 give evidence of the systematic instability of the monetary transmission
eﬀectiveness. Therefore, a time-varying coeﬃcients VAR should be selected to study monetary
transmission rather than a ﬁxed coeﬃcients VAR.
Figure 6 shows that the main direct transmission channels which contribute to the failure
of the monetary policy to avoid the crisis are the house asset price and the credit in volume
channels. The ﬁrst starts to be ineﬀective just before the real estate bubble in 2005:2, and
the second registers a deep disruption since 2007:4 a quarter after the beginning of the growth
12slowdown. In a lesser extent, the cost credit channel is involved, particularly between 2007:3
and 2008:1. Nevertheless, the recovered eﬀectiveness of the cost credit channel during the
three last quarters is not coupled with a similar eﬀectiveness for the credit channel in volume.
This point is consistent with the idea that the recent US economic recession is not due to a
sharp increase in the lending rate. The unfavourable adjustment for growth made by ﬁnancial
institutions rather involve the credit in volume. As a consequence, the housing sector loses
its funding and there is no way for the monetary policy to manage eﬀectively the aggregate
demand through the real estate. One can notice that the interest channel is eﬀective during
the period 2004-2008 without any break. Nevertheless, it is obvious that since the beginning of
the crisis in 2007:3 its eﬀectiveness on the output gap diminishes with a more rapid decreasing
speed in the early quarters of the slowdown.
Figure 5 also allows to identify where the failure in the direct monetary transmission occurs
when the output gap is focussed. Apparently and without any surprise, the main channels
in concern are the housing price and the credit in volume channels. In other words, the
same channels that justify the incapacity of the monetary policy to avoid the slowdown in the
aggregate demand are those that are involved in the bad management of the headline inﬂation.
Indeed, the house asset price channel starts to be ineﬀective just similarly to the crucial date
concerning the inﬂation gap dynamics (i.e. 2006:4). The credit in volume reinforces the
ineﬀectiveness of the monetary policy when the inﬂation gap starts to skyrocket in 2008:2.
In a lesser extent, the interest rate channel is responsible for the monetary policy failure to
control inﬂation with a null eﬀectiveness since 2008:2.
Before the crisis period and except of some transitory breaks in the interest rate channel
eﬀectiveness on the inﬂation gap, results show moderate ﬂuctuations in the transmission eﬀec-
tiveness. Sometimes a very short decrease in the eﬀectiveness is identiﬁable. This decline of
the monetary transmission eﬀectiveness is the continuation of a same observable phenomenon
as mentioned by Hoppner, Melzer, Neumann (2008) when they used a (Kalman ﬁlter) TV-
VAR for US data going from 1962 to 2002. From a stylized model, Boivin and Giannoni
( 2 0 0 2 )s h o wt h a tad e c l i n ei nt h er e a le ﬀects of monetary policy can be explained by a central
bank that mainly focusses on output gap minimization, that is one speciﬁcity of the Fed in
comparison with other main central banks like the European one. Whatever the speciﬁcation
the previous authors used, they do not integrate intermediary variables between the monetary
policy instrument and the targets on the real sphere. Therefore, their conclusions do not allow
the exposure of each transmission channel implication.
Our results lead to conclude in favour of an intermediate position between those claiming
the ineﬀective US monetary policy during the crisis and those claiming an insuﬃcient eﬀec-
tiveness. The monetary transmission channels, dealing with the main ﬁnancial sectors where
the source of the crisis is found, are clearly ineﬀective. Nevertheless, other channels may still
be eﬀective but not enough to counterbalance the quite simultaneous ineﬀectiveness of the
previous transmission mechanisms.
Anyway, the current crisis seems to be a change in what could be found in previous periods.
Indeed, Hoppner, Melzer, Neumann (2008) from a TV-VAR, Garcia and Schaller (2002) and Lo
and Piger (2005) from a Markov-switching model, ﬁnd that the eﬀects of monetary policy are
greater in a recession than in a boom, by reasoning on previous time periods. Even if they do
not integrate intermediate variables linked to the monetary transmission in their studies, our
results tell that in this ongoing recession, the eﬀectiveness level of the monetary transmission
clearly matters, particularly during the ﬁrst quarters of the crisis.
13This result justiﬁes the accuracy to use new monetary instruments beyond the Fed funds
rate to restore the ability to manage both the output gap and the price stability. This con-
clusion is consistent with Cecchetti (2008). The fall of 2007-2008 is an indisputable proof
that the traditional monetary policy intervention failed, what allows innovations for monetary
policymakers.
At the national scale, as Calomiris (2008) argues, for instance a convenient use of the
discount window should permit to solve local failure on the ﬁnancial markets without changing
the Fed funds rate. This may help to maintain simultaneously the price stability. The Fed
created also new lending procedures (Term Auction Facility, Primary Dealer Credit Facility)
and the Term Securities Lending Facility... that changes the Fed balance sheet composition
instead of its size (like in traditional open market operations). Besides, at an international
scale, more cooperation among the main central banks clearly appears as one necessary but
not suﬃcient condition to prevent ﬁnancial instability to inﬂuence the macroeconomic stability
in a globalized world.
However, the aformentioned econometric study focusses only on direct transmission chan-
nels and does not consider the induced transmission initiated through the complementary links
among the direct transmission mechanisms. That is the reason why the level of eﬀectiveness
is not still totally comparable among each transmission channel. That is the reason why our
modelling may fail to identify transmission through the real exchange rates. As a result, the
modelling should be improved from an integration of complementary eﬀects among the studied
transmission mechanisms, perhaps from the integration of several intermediate variables inside
the estimated TV-VARs, where causal chains involving two transmission variables could be
tested before inﬂuencing the real sphere.
6. Conclusion
Among the causes of the subprime crisis, the paper stresses on the Fed monetary policy
responsability. Particularly, the error in the regulation of the two pillars (output gap and
inﬂa t i o ng a p )i sa n a l y s e dt h r o u g ht h em a c r om o n e t a r yt r a n s m i s s i o ne ﬀectiveness. According to
Kuttner and Mosser (2002) p.17, "it is a task for empirical research to assess the macro impact
of the various channels of monetary transmission and to look for changes in the channels’
strength over time".
A dynamic measure of the strength of monetary transmission mechanisms is suggested and
applied to study direct transmission of the interest rate, the credit, the assets prices and the
exchange rate channels. The main result is that the Fed incapacity to prevent and struggle
against the crisis is due a disruption of its monetary policy eﬀectiveness on the key markets of
the crisis: the credit and the real estate sector. Even if some eﬀectiveness remains elsewhere
before and along the crisis, it is not enough to counterbalance the ﬁnancial markets dynamics
unfavourable to the macro stability. It notably justiﬁes the need of new tools beyond the
open market operations to lead the monetary policy toward a good macro regulation and even
ﬁnancial one.
The next step of the research consists in integrating the complementary dimension among
monetary transmission mechanisms in order to obtain a more global view on what occurred
on the traditional monetary transmission around the subprime crisis. It would be convenient
to adjust the econometrics. Overparameterized VAR should be in competition with alterna-
tive and more recent VAR speciﬁcations to better give evidence of structural changes in the
"systematic" varying monetary transmission process.
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